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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT RICHARD SCOTI, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12426 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence im-
posed upon appellant after his plea of guilty to the sale 
of drugs in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-4 (3) 
( 1953) , as amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State seeks affirmation of the lower court's 
judgment and conviction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On December 29, 1970, defendant, Robert Richard 
Scott, after entering a plea of guilty to the sale of a 
hallucinogenic drug, LSD, was sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison for five years to life pursuant to Utah C ·· 
An Ode n. § 58-33-4 ( 3) ( 1953) , as amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 26, 1970, appellant was charged, by com-
plaint filed in the City Court of Moab, Grand County, 
State of Utah, with selling Lysergic acid diethylamide 
(LSD) and Phencyclidine to one R. Drew Moren on 
April 24, 1970, in violation of Utah Code Ann § 58-33-6(1) 
(19.53), as amended. On December 29, 1970, the day set 
for the trial in the Seventh Judicial District Court, coun-
sel for appellant asked permission of the court to with-
draw the plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, 
with sentencing being stayed until the Adult Probation 
and Parole Board could review the defendant's personal 
data and report. After receiving the Board's recommen-
dation to deny appellant probation (R. 11), the trial 
court, on February 5, 1971, sentenced appellant to im-
prisonment in the state prison from five years to life with 
no consideration for parole until he had served at least 
three years, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-4(3) 
(1953), as amended. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IN RENDERING ITS JUDGMENT AND 
SE NT EN CE UPON APPELLANT, THE 
LOWER COURT DID NOT FAIL TO CON-
SIDER PROBATION. 
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The crux of the appeal is whether or not the trial 
court failed to consider probation in its sentencing of 
appellant. As Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953) grants 
to the trial court the discretion to suspend the imposition 
of the execution of a sentence in a criminal matter when 
it appears compatible with the public interest, this Court, 
in State v. Barlow, ------ Utah 2d ______ , 483 P. 2d 236 (1971), 
held that the Legislature did not intend to abrogate this 
discretionary power by the wording in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-13a-44 ( 4) (1953), as amended, which states: " ... 
shall not be eligible for release upon completion of sen-
tence or on parole or on any other basis until he has 
served not less than three years." As the lower court in 
Barlow had erroneously believed that the wording of the 
statute required a mandatory sentence, and did not, 
therefore, consider probation, this Court remanded the 
case for the trial court to make such consideration. Id. 
at 237. 
However, in the instant case, the record fully illus-
trntes that Judge Sheya fully exercised his discretion-
ary powers by considering probation for the appellant, 
but concluded that the public interest would be best 
served by committing appellant to the prison. 
Appellant was not a neophyte convicted for selling a 
few pills to his friends; rather, he had a previous convic-
tion of negligent homicide (R. 10) and had been arrested 
in the present case for a sale that included seventy LSD 
pills, twenty pills of another synthetic marijuana, and 
an offer to sell even more pills (R. 10, 11). 
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Before sentencing appellant, Judge Sheya had de-
liberated for several days upon the matter (R. 10), He 
had closely studied the Probation and Parole Depart. 
ment's recommendation that appellant be denied proba-
tion (R. 11) , and had reread several times the presentence 
report which had been prepared to determine if there 
were any mitigating circumstances that would warrant 
probation (R. 10, 11). 
As appellant had demonstrated his inability to vol-
untarily seek for and adhere to medical treatment, evi-
denced by his two charges of possession in Seattle (R. 
16), Judge Sheya personally made inquiry into the types 
of facilities available to the court in cases like this and 
into what kinds of treatments the court could arrange 
for (R. 17) . Based upon the presentence report and rec-
ommendation, and based upon the court's determination 
to provide appellant with effective treatment, Judge 
Sheya sentenced appellant to five years imprisonment 
and took written precautions to insure that appellant 
would receive proper treatment at the prison: 
". . . and I feel, I have thought this matter 
over carefully and I don't want to deny you an.Y 
medical treatment that you may need. That JS 
why I went to the length of calling the Warden 
to see if there was something that he could do 
in this regard. He assured me if I wrote a letter 
that he would see to it that whatever treatment 
was available or could be furnished would be fur· 
nished to you. I feel that this is about the best 
this court can do in this regard" (R. 19-20) . 
• 
While recognizing that the court had the discretion-
ary power to rrant probation in cases involving the sale 
of drugs, the trial court also realized that the apparent 
intent of the legislature in enacting Utah Code Ann. § 
58-33-6 (1) (1953), as amended, was to require incarcera-
tion for at least three years if the trial court decided that 
the public interest required commitment rather than pro-
bation. Barlow, supra, at 237. As Judge Sheya had con-
cluded that the public interest required appellant's im-
prisonment rather than probation, he had no alternative 
but to sentence appellant to five years to life (R. 20). 
Perhaps the most salient evidence as to the consid-
eration given by the trial court to the propriety of grant-
ing appellant probation is the admission by appellant's 
counsel that the trial court had the power to grant pro-
bation in the instant case and that the trial court had 
previously explicitly stated that it would exercise that 
power. As stated by appellant's counsel in the record: 
". . . (B) ut I also recognize the Court's in-
herent power to suspend sentences and place 
people on probation or have different conditions 
short of sending him to prison . . . that the court 
has that power, and I recall that the court indi-
cated the last time that we were here on this mat-
ter that the court had such power, although the 
court made no indication as to what the sentence 
would be, . . . yet the court acknowledged the 
fact that if the court after seeing, receiving all 
the information that it desired prior to imposing 
sentence decided that there should be a suspension 
of that sentence that the court does have this in-
herent power" (R. 11-12). 
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CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the record demonstrates that the trial 
judge fully considered the propriety of granting probation 
to appellant before he passed judgment and sentence 
upon him. 
The State th2refore respectfully submits that the 
Barlow decision does not apply and this Court should 
affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAURENN.BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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